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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001184

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PHUM](#) [KPKO](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL?

REF: NEW DELHI 3048

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Looking At Greater UN Involvement

11. (C) Tamrat Samuel, visiting special advisor to the UN Undersecretary General for Political Affairs, joined by UN Resident Representative Matthew Kahane, and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) head Ian Martin discussed with the Ambassador on May 8 the prospects for increasing UN involvement as Nepal transitions to democracy and, hopefully, peace. Samuel explained the purpose of his visit was to get a sense of what the government of Nepal (GON) might request. He said that he needed to explain to the GON that the UN might not be able to bring in a large international force, but a mix of civilian and international monitoring could be possible under a UN mandate. Martin stated that resource and mandate issues could make it difficult for it to be done under the OHCHR umbrella. He noted that New York/DPKO logistics would likely be needed to get vehicles, personnel, etc. on the ground to have a national reach.

Getting India On Board

12. C) Samuel said that a military planner from UN DPKO, Col. Ian St. Claire, planned to join him in Nepal on May 9. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of the GOI's buy-in to a UN role both in monitoring the cease-fire, which New Delhi seemed to think was unnecessary, and possible subsequent decommissioning of weapons. Our UN interlocutors acknowledged the importance of India. Samuel said that he and St. Clair planned to travel next to New Delhi to discuss possible UN involvement in Nepal with the GOI. The Ambassador also suggested the need to have an objective witness observe the peace talks, noting that the GOI could not play such a role by itself. Here again, India would need to be on board with the concept.

Checking Maoist Intentions

¶3. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the international community should not act as if it were a given that the Maoists truly intended to come in from out of the cold; that would only increase the pressure on the GON to conclude a less than acceptable deal. Samuel agreed that the international community should fully support the government's efforts. He stressed that the idea was "for the Maoists to come in and play by the rules of mainstream politics, not to create a new mainstream." Samuel stated that was why the two sides needed to clearly spell out in detail the responsibilities of each side under the cease-fire in the code of conduct, in addition to the mechanisms for monitoring it.

Comment

¶4. (C) Events are progressing rapidly here. Members of the Nepal Government's Peace Secretariat are negotiating with the Maoists on a code of conduct for the cease-fire. The need for international monitoring of the cease-fire is clear to us, especially given continued Maoist extortion and abductions. Based on discussions here, it may well take some effort to convince New Delhi to come on board.

MORIARTY